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Abstract
This study investigates the effects of migration possibilities on the demand for education 
and human capital formation in the labour-sending country. The paper assumes that 
workers have to pay a pecuniary cost privately to receive education under budget 
constraints. It was found that higher migration possibilities result in an increase in the 
number of workers who demand education due to increases in its return. However, 
these workers lower the individual demand for education due to price increases. When 
the education supply is insufficient, higher migration possibilities may lower average 
human capital; that is, a brain drain may occur. This contrasts with the usual argument 
that emphasises the positive effect of migration possibilities. Restrictive immigration 
policies were found not to be completely detrimental to labour-sending countries since 
such policies may enhance the human capital formation.
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 I. Introduction
This paper investigates the effects of migration possibilities to a foreign (labour-
receiving) country on the demand for education and human capital formation in a 
home (labour-sending) country when workers are heterogeneous in their innate ability 
and have to pay a pecuniary cost by themselves to receive education. Unlike previous 
analyses, this paper shows that due to the increase in the cost of education and a 
subsequent decrease in the return on education, migration possibilities to the foreign 
country do not necessarily enhance human capital formation in the home country. From 
this study’s results, the positive effect of the foreign country’s restrictive immigration 
policy on the home country’s human capital can be derived.
With an increase in the number of workers who migrate internationally, many 
labour-receiving developed countries have become stringent in accepting migrants, as 
argued by Boeri and Brücker (2005), Facchini and Mayda (2008), and Felbermayr et 
al. (2010).1 This trend poses a serious threat to labour-sending developing countries 
because they are heavily dependent on remittances sent by migrants.2
In addition, many labour-receiving developed countries have become selective - 
they prefer to accept skilled migrants.3 For example, the Australian Government (2011) 
has decided to implement the new Skilled Migrant Selection Register, SkillSelect, to 
accept migrants who are skilled and needed in specific occupational groups. Such a 
policy encourages the outflow of skilled workers, who are also markedly scarce in 
these countries, from developing countries. Other evidence of significant skilled worker 
outflows released by the World Bank (2011) includes the high emigration rate (over 
80 percent) for the tertiary-educated population of Guyana, Granada, Jamaica, St. 
Vincent, the Grenadines, and Haiti in 2000. Moreover, utilising the data of Docquier 
1 According to the World Bank (2011), the stock of migrants as of 2010 is 215.8 million, accounting for 3.2 percent of the world 
population.
2 It is widely accepted that remittances sent by migrants are an important financial resource for these countries. See Shimada (2010, 
2011a) for the effects of sending and receiving fees on the amount of remittances and the role of altruism in sending and spending 
remittances.
3 Huber et al. (2010) reveal that highly-skilled migrants play a positive role in productivity development in the so-called skill 
intensive industries.
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and Marfouk (2006), Grogger and Hanson (2011) show that emigrants are, in general, 
positively selected in terms of schooling. These observations suggest that many labour-
sending developing countries are experiencing an outflow of human capital, or a brain 
drain, due to skilled worker emigration.
Based on these facts, it is argued that labour-sending countries are negatively 
affected by the restrictive and selective migration policies of labour-receiving developed 
countries. Previous studies conclude that such migration policies have only negative 
effects on labour-sending countries.
The effects of emigration on labour-sending countries have long been a very 
controversial issue. Docquier and Rapoport (2009) divide the controversies into three 
generations.4 Arguments by Grubel and Scott (1966) and Berry and Soligo (1969), 
which can be included in the first generation, illustrate emigration’s positive aspects, 
assuming a competitive economy. On the other hand, arguments by Bhagwati and 
Hamada (1974), Hamada and Bhagwati (1975), and Bhagwati and Rodriguez (1975), 
which can be included in the second generation, emphasise the negative effects, 
assuming a non-competitive economy.
Recent arguments put forth by Mountford (1997), Stark et al. (1997, 1998, 2009a, 
b), and Beine et al. (2001, 2008), which can be classified into the third generation, have 
been gaining popularity.
They derive the positive effects of emigration, and their results are independent of 
the economy’s competitiveness or non-competitiveness.5 It is a fact that labour-sending 
countries lose a portion of their human capital by the outflow of workers; however, 
migration possibilities increase the return on education. This induces workers to 
increase demand for education, which enhances human capital formation. Accordingly, 
workers in labour-sending countries may experience brain gain by the increase in 
migration possibilities.
As noted by these studies, obtaining education incurs costs. If workers can 
manipulate working hours, they will reduce their working hours and earnings in order to 
obtain education.6 Such an opportunity cost certainly affects the demand for education 
and human capital formation.
4 I do not intend to survey the related literature here.
5 According to an empirical analysis by Beine et al. (2011), whether brain gain occurs depends on the labour-sending countries’ 
incomes. In particular, they found that low-income countries experience brain gain, but they found no such evidence in middle-income 
and high-income countries. Assuming the different types of workers, that is, skilled and unskilled workers, Shimada (2011b) theoretically 
shows that brain drain and brain gain can occur simultaneously in the labour-sending country.
6 Stark et al. (1998) explicitly includes an opportunity cost for education in the two-period model.
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However, the opportunity cost is not the only cost involved. Workers usually 
have to pay a pecuniary cost to obtain education. Primary and secondary education is 
predominantly provided through taxes; however, tertiary education cannot be provided 
only by taxes. Whether it is optimal for an individual or an economy to finance tertiary 
education privately or publicly, most individuals generally pay a portion or all of the 
pecuniary costs.7 In fact, the price is established in the education market, and individuals 
face financing problems when obtaining education. Whether and to what extent 
individuals can afford the pecuniary cost affects the demand for education and human 
capital formation. Nevertheless, previous studies have not given appropriate attention to 
this constraint.
If workers have to privately pay the pecuniary cost for education, they will be 
sensitive to the education price, which will affect human capital formation. For 
example, a higher demand for education due to higher migration possibilities and/
or an insufficient domestic supply of education may increase the education price and 
lower its return. This may reduce the aggregate demand for education. On the other 
hand, the number of workers who satisfy the budget constraint and demand education 
may increase with migration possibilities. This may increase the aggregate demand for 
education. These possible effects have mostly been neglected in previous studies.8
Therefore, this study incorporates the education market in the home country and 
explicitly considers the transaction of education in order to illustrate the effects of 
migration possibilities on the demand for education and human capital formation 
through changes in the price of education. In doing so, this study attempts to 
draw further inferences on brain drain and brain gain due to changes in migration 
possibilities.
This paper finds that higher migration possibilities increase the education price 
and reduce the individual demand for education by workers who satisfy the budget 
constraint; on the other hand, as migration possibilities increase, a larger number of 
workers satisfy the budget constraint and thus demand education. In the case where 
the home country cannot provide its residents with education sufficiently, I find that 
the former negative effect dominates the latter positive effect and that higher migration 
possibilities hamper human capital formation.
This result contrasts with those of previous studies since it suggests that restrictive 
7 See Barr (2004) for a discussion on how higher education should be funded.
8 The study by Nakajima and Nakamura (2009) is an exception. They build a model which incorporates an educational institute and 
the education price; their model illustrates that because of the increase in the education price arising from demand by the rich, the poor 
are gradually excluded from higher education, and consequently, income inequality between the rich and poor expands in the long run.
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migration policies adopted today by many labour-receiving developed countries might 
lead to brain gain of labour-sending developing countries; that is, an increase in the 
average human capital. Restrictive migration policies reduce the outflow of workers and 
human capital, which clearly has favourable effects on human capital in labour-sending 
countries. In addition, through the decrease in the education price, lower migration 
possibilities increase the individual demand for education, which encourages human 
capital formation. Favourable effects of restrictive migration polices on human capital 
formation through the education market have been left uninvestigated by previous 
studies.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows: Section II presents a model of a 
two-country economy with migration possibilities from the home country to the foreign 
country. I assume that workers in the home country are heterogeneous in their innate 
ability and that there is an education market in that country. Section III examines the 
effects of migration possibilities on the demand for education. Section IV examines 
the effects of migration possibilities on the average human capital of the home country 
and draws inferences on the outcome of restrictive migration policies on human capital 
formation. Section V presents the conclusion.
II. The Model
I assume that an economy consists of home and foreign countries. Workers in the 
home country are heterogeneous in their innate ability and live for two periods — the 
first and second period. They provide labour in both periods, but receive education 
only in the first period. The productivity in the first period is determined by their innate 
ability and a fixed amount of publicly-financed education. I assume this education to 
be one unit, and workers do not have to directly pay for it. They may further receive 
privately-financed education via self-funding. Privately-financed education is provided 
in the first period to those who pay for it and gives utility in that period to them, and 
it increases their productivity only in the second period. Workers in the home country 
migrate to the foreign country in the second period with probabilities that depend on 
their amount of privately-financed education. All migrated workers earn higher wages 
in the foreign country than in the home country.
I incorporate the resource market for human capital formation, that is, the privately-
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financed  competitive education market into the home country. 
Worker i has innate ability ai that is distributed uniformly between ε (>0) and 1+ε . 
By receiving one unit of publicly-financed education, innate ability ai is transformed 
into ai efficiency units of labour in the first period (if workers did not receive publicly-
financed education, efficiency units of labour would be zero even with positive innate 
ability). In addition, the worker may demand privately-financed education by ei(≥1) and 
forms human capital by ln ei . This increases the efficiency units of labour to ai(1 + ln ei) 
in the second period. If the worker cannot pay for privately-financed education due to a 
budget constraint, only publicly-financed education is received in the first period. In this 
case, the efficiency units of labour in the second period are also ai . 
In order to demand privately-financed education by ei , worker i has to bear the 
pecuniary cost privately by c− +pei , where  c− ( >0) is a constant denoting fixed cost, and 
p is the price of privately-financed education determined to equalise its demand and 
supply in that market. In addition, as in Stark et al. (1998), worker i has to give up a 
portion of the labour supply to receive education. Since the amount of publicly - financed 
education is given, the larger the amount of privately-financed education, the shorter 
the first period’s working hour is. Accordingly, the working hour can be described as 
1 -h(ei), where dh(ei) / dei >0 and 0 < h (ei) <1.  
In the second period, workers in the home country can migrate to the foreign 
country. In general, workers with higher productivity are more likely to be accepted in 
the labour-receiving country. This suggests that, in my model, a worker with a larger 
amount of privately-financed education has higher migration possibilities. Accordingly, 
worker i has migration possibilities 0 <θ + m(ei) <1, where θ (>0) is a constant and 
dm(ei)/dei >0. θ represents migration possibilities that are provided independently of 
the amount of privately-financed education.
Net earnings of worker i are equal to 
ai{1−h (ei)}wH − c−  − pei +ρai (1+ln ei)[{θ + m(ei)}wF+ {1 −θ −m(ei)}wH ],
where wF > wH > 0 are wages per efficiency unit of labour in the foreign and home 
countries, respectively, and 0 <ρ ≤1 is the subjective time preference rate. Privately-
financed education reduces the first-period wages by aih (ei)wH, whereas it increases the 
second-period wages relative to the first period by ρ ai (1+ln ei)(wF−wH) m(ei). I assume 
that these two effects offset each other, that is,  −ai h(ei)wH +ρai (1+ ln ei)(wF−wH)
m(ei) = 0.  Under this assumption, net earnings can be defined as  aiwH − c−  − pei +ρai 
(1+ln ei){θ wF+ (1−θ )wH}.
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Since worker i has to pay the education cost using his/her earnings, this cost must 
not exceed the earnings, and the net earnings have to be non-negative, that is,
aiwH − c−  − pei +ρai (1+ln ei){θ wF+ (1−θ )wH}(≡Ui) ≥0.
This budget constraint suggests that the cost of education has to be financed by the 
earnings in the first and second periods. If the first period’s earnings are not sufficient 
to pay for education, the worker borrows money and repays it in the second period. This 
is not possible if there is no credit market. Accordingly, my model implicitly assumes a 
credit market. However, in my model, the worker lives only for two periods and there 
is no succeeding generation to which he/she passes on any debt. As a result, the worker 
cannot borrow money beyond the second period.
Worker i demands privately-financed education by paying the pecuniary cost 
to maximise utility U~, which is assumed to be the sum of the utility derived from 




 =  u− + aiwH − c−  − pei +ρai (1+ln ei){θ wF+ (1−θ )wH},                   (1)
where u− denotes the utility derived from privately-financed education, being a 
positive constant, larger than  ρai{θ wF+ (1−θ )wH}+ c−  if ei >0, and zero if ei =0.
9
In general, even if a worker satisfies the budget constraint, he/she does not 
necessarily demand education. However, in my model, from the assumption that 
privately-financed education gives a fixed utility to those who receive it, a worker 
whose net earnings are non-negative can attain higher utility by receiving privately-
financed education. Therefore, a worker who satisfies the budget constraint always 
demands privately-financed education.10
9 If a worker cannot satisfy the budget constraint, the utility function will take a different form from Equation (1). In such a case, the 
utility is a constant.
10 For a worker who satisfies the budget constraint, the difference between the utility derived from taking privately-financed education 
0>iei
U  and the utility derived from not taking such education 
0=iei
U  is 
i
iU  ln })1({ HFiii wweapecu θθρ −++−−  . Subsequently, I derive the individual 
demand for education as pwwae HFii })1({ θθρ −+=  (see Equation 2). As a result, )1}()1({00 iHFieiei ewwacuUU ii −−+−−=− => θθρ ln . 
Therefore, if  })1({ HFi wwau θθρ −+> ,c+   then a worker always prefers to demand privately-financed education.
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III. Effects of Migration Possibilities on Education Demand
This section examines how migration possibilities affect the demand for privately-
financed education by workers in the home country. In particular, I attempt to find out 
whether the number of workers who satisfy the budget constraint and demand privately-
financed education will increase and whether such workers will increase their individual 
demand with migration possibilities.
I assume that the worker with innate ability a~ , where εε +<< 1~a , satisfies the 
budget constraint with an equality, .0~ ==aai iU
 Subsequently, I show that by making 
an assumption on c−, worker i with innate ability ]1,~( ε+∈ aai  satisfies the budget 




U  and demands privately-financed education. 
On the other hand, a worker with innate ability )~,[ aai ε∈  does not satisfy the budget 
constraint, ,0~ <<≤ aai iU ε  and thus cannot demand privately-financed education. a
~  is 
an endogenous variable affected by θ . 
I derive the demand for privately-financed education by the worker with innate 
ability ]1,~[ ε+∈ aai  from .0
~ =ii deUd / ei= 0. Such a worker demands privately-financed 
education by
         
                                                                                                                           (2)
 
                                                






   
Worker i demands a larger amount of privately-financed education if the worker is 
more innately talented or if migration possibilities are higher because such conditions 
increase the return of such education (∂ei /∂ai>0, ∂ei /∂θ >0). Higher price of privately-
financed education decreases its demand since the higher price lowers the return on 
such education (∂ei /∂p <0). 
Summing up the individual demand for privately-financed education, the home 














I assume that the home country’s aggregate supply of privately-financed education, 
S, is a constant  S = b− (>0).
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To be certain, I can make the supply of privately-financed education dependent on 
its price and other variables. However, this supply will be inelastic in the short run, 
since, as suggested by the World Bank (2000), the quantity of effective education is 
determined not only by the quantity itself, such as the number of teachers or schools but 
also by the quality, such as the provision of well-designed academic programs - which 
are difficult to improve in a short period of time. We infer that the supply of privately-
financed education is limited in developing countries.
Assuming that the privately-financed education market is competitive, the 
equilibrium condition, D = S , provides us with its equilibrium price
 
                       )),,
~((
2
~)1(})1({ 22 θεθθρ apa
b
wwp HF ≡−+−+=                          (3) 
 
where a~ is given exogenously here (subsequently, I illustrate how it will be affected 
by θ ). If a~ is smaller, that is, if a larger number of workers satisfy the budget constraint 
and demand privately-financed education, the aggregate demand is larger. As a result, 
the price is higher (∂ p (a~,θ ) /∂ a~ ).0)( ~ <≡ ap 0).  Higher migration possibilities increase 
the return on privately-financed education and thereby increase the aggregate demand, 
leading to the higher price (∂p (a~,θ )/∂θ >0).
By substituting Equation (3) into Equation (2), worker i’s privately-financed 
education demand is








                                                                                  (4)
where a~ is given exogenously here (subsequently, I illustrate how it will be affected 
by θ ). A higher innate ability increases the individual demand for privately-financed 
education since it increases its return .)0)~,(( >∂∂ iii aaae  The larger the a~, the lower 
the price is, since a smaller number of workers demand privately-financed education. 
This enables individuals to demand more ).0~)~,(( >∂∂ aaae ii . Migration possibilities 
increase the individual demand for privately-financed education, owing to the increase 
in its return, but this increases the price, and thereby it decreases its return and reduces 
its demand. The former positive effect is completely offset by the latter negative effect 
(notice that the numerator and the denominator in Equation (2) increase by the same 
proportion with migration possibilities). Therefore, through this price effect, migration 
possibilities have no impact on the individual demand for privately-financed education. 
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However, I subsequently show that migration possibilities affect the individual demand 
through another price effect, that is, higher migration possibilities make a~ smaller 
(make the number of workers who satisfy the budget constraint larger), leading to the 
higher price and the lower individual demand for privately-financed education (see 
the second term on the right-hand side of Equation (7) and Equation (2), or combining 
these, Equation (8)).
By substituting Equations (3) and (4) into Equation (1) and differentiating the 
resulting equation with respect to ai , I find that net earnings increase with innate ability, 
dUi /dai >0.
11 In other words, an individual worker attains higher net earnings if the 





U 12 Under such an assumption, as we conjectured, the worker with innate 
ability ]1,~( ε+∈ aai  satisfies the budget constraint with the inequality, ,01~ >+≤< εiaaiU
 
and demands privately-financed education; whereas, the worker with innate ability 
)~,[ aai ε∈  does not satisfy the budget constraint, ,0~ <<≤ aai iU ε  and cannot demand 
privately-financed education.
From Equation (4), the worker with innate ability a~ demands privately-financed 
education by









                                        (5) 
 
To illustrate how migration possibilities affect a~, I substitute Equations (3) and (5) 
into Equation (1). From the assumption that ,0~ ==aai iU  I derive
.0})1()}{~(~1{~)~(~),~(~ =−+++−− HFH wwaeaaeapcwa θθρθ ln
Totally differentiating this equation with respect to a~ and θ , I derive Ada~ +Bdθ = 0,
where
11  }.)1(]{}
~)1{(21[ 122 HFiHii wwaabwdadU θθερ −+−+++=
−ln  
12
    






































As a~ is larger, that is, as the number of workers who satisfy the budget constraint 
is smaller, net earnings are higher (A>0). On the other hand, since higher migration 
possibilities increase the return on privately-financed education, they increase net 
earnings by ρ (wF−wH)a
~{1+ln e~ (a~)}, and in contrast, they increase the price and reduce 
net earnings by .~)( aww HF −− ρ  Since the former positive effect outweighs the latter 
negative effect, higher migration possibilities lead to larger net earnings (B>0). 
Accordingly,







                          (6)
Therefore, the number of workers who satisfy the budget constraint and demand 
privately-financed education increases with migration possibilities. This is likely to 
have a positive effect on the economy’s overall human capital formation.
From Equations (3) and (6), migration possibilities increase the equilibrium price of 
privately-financed education, both directly and indirectly through a decrease in a~ 
  

























                                        
(7)
 
The higher return on privately-financed education increases the individual 
demand, leading to an increase in the aggregate demand and a higher price. This 
effect is described by the first term on the right-hand side of Equation (7). In addition, 
higher migration possibilities increase the number of workers who satisfy the budget 
constraint, thereby increasing the aggregate demand and price. The second term on the 
right-hand side of Equation (7) corresponds to this effect.
I determine how migration possibilities affect the equilibrium amount of education 
for the worker with innate ability ],1,~( ε+∈ aai , utilising Equations (4) and (6)
   
                                                                                                                           (8)
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 Higher migration possibilities increase the number of workers who satisfy the 
budget constraint, which in turn increases the price and reduces the equilibrium amount 
of privately-financed education for the individual worker. This is likely to have a 
negative effect on the economy’s overall human capital formation.
To summarise, migration possibilities increase the return on privately-financed 
education and enable more workers to satisfy the budget constraint and demand it. 
However, at the same time, through price increases, higher migration possibilities lower 
the return on privately-financed education and reduce such workers’ individual demand.
IV. Effects of Migration Possibilities 
                               on Average Human Capital
This section examines how migration possibilities influence the home country’s 
average human capital, that is, whether workers in that country experience brain gain 
or brain drain, and draws implications for the effect of the labour-receiving countries’ 
restrictive migration policies on the labour-sending countries’ human capital formation.
At the end of the first period, the home country’s average human capital in terms of 
efficiency units of labour is equal to
 









 ln                        (9) 
   



























According to Equation (9), migration possibilities affect the average human capital 
at the end of the first period through changes in the aggregate demand for privately-
financed education by workers who satisfy the budget constraint. Regarding this, I 
derived two opposing effects: a positive effect on the number of workers who actually 
demand privately-financed education (Equation (6) and a negative effect on individual 
demand (Equation (8). I infer that the former positive effect increases AHC1 , whereas 
the latter negative effect decreases AHC1 ,  since
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I cannot determine in general whether migration possibilities increase or decrease 
average human capital before migration actually takes place. Higher migration 
possibilities increase the return on privately-financed education by increasing the 
possibility to receive higher wages in the foreign country, leading to a larger number 
of workers who satisfy the budget constraint and demand it. However, migration 
possibilities also lower the return on privately-financed education by increasing its price, 
leading to a lower individual demand by an individual worker who satisfies the budget 
constraint. Moreover, I cannot establish whether the net return on education is positive or 
negative. As a result, I cannot determine in general whether human capital formation will 
be encouraged or discouraged with migration possibilities. If the education market did 
not exist as assumed by previous studies, then the latter negative effect would be non-
existent and workers would always be encouraged to accumulate human capital.
However, if I assume the availability of privately-financed education in the home 
country, I find that 01 <θddAHC  if b
− is small such that ]}~)1{(~2[1 22 aab −+> εln  , 
and 01 >θddAHC  if b
− is large such that ]}~)1{(~2[1 22 aab −+< εln . Accordingly, if the 
supply of privately-financed education is low, the negative effect dominates and human 
capital formation will be discouraged by higher migration possibilities. In the opposite 
case in which the supply is large, the positive effect dominates and human capital 
formation will be encouraged.
In the second period, θ  of the home country’s workers migrate to the foreign 
country. At the end of the second period, the home country’s average human capital is 
),()1( 21 AHCAHC ≡−θ , and the effect of migration possibilities can be expressed as
 
                                                                       (11)








Since higher migration possibilities lower the number of workers who remain in 
the home country after migration, the average human capital decreases (the first term 
on the right-hand side of Equation (11). On the other hand, as Equation (10) suggests, 
higher migration possibilities either encourage or discourage human capital formation 
in the first period, depending on the size of b−  (the second term on the right-hand side 
of Equation (11)). Accordingly, it is impossible to determine in general how migration 
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possibilities affect the average human capital after migration.
However, if the home country’s supply of privately-financed education is low, then 
Equation (11) suggests that migration possibilities certainly lower the average human 
capital at the end of the second period. In other words, if the home country cannot 
sufficiently provide education, then the country experiences brain drain, in the sense 
that the average human capital reduces after workers leave the country, as the foreign 
country takes a more positive attitude towards accepting migrants. In my model, if 
the supply of privately-financed education is limited, higher migration possibilities 
discourage workers from accumulating human capital (the ‘new’ type of brain drain) 
in the first period as well as increase the outflow of workers (the ‘conventional’ type 
of brain drain) in the second period.13 Accordingly, post-migration average human 
capital is always lower as workers are more likely to be accepted in the foreign country. 
In other words, there are no possibilities that workers in the home country experience 
brain gain after migration has occurred.
This result contrasts with those of previous analyses, according to which brain gain 
can occur with increases in migration possibilities. It is true that a larger number of 
workers will have left the home country by the end of the second period, but in their 
models higher migration possibilities certainly increase the return on education and 
encourage workers to accumulate human capital in the first period. This is because 
in their model there is no education market and no negative effect on the return on 
education due to the increase in the education price.
My results conversely suggest that restrictive migration policies implemented by 
many labour - receiving developed countries will increase the post-migration average 
human capital of labour - sending developing countries, in which education is usually 
inadequately supplied. Under such policies, as I expect, the outflow of workers will be 
checked and this will prevent the loss of human capital. In addition, unlike previous 
analyses, individual demand for education by those who can afford it increases, which 
in turn contributes to human capital formation. This is because in my model the 
education price decreases with a decrease in migration possibilities. Accordingly, the 
total positive effects on human capital are greater than the effects that arise only from 
the smaller outflow of workers.
Therefore, I conclude that labour-receiving developed countries’ restrictive attitudes 
can have a beneficial effect on labour-sending developing countries through brain gain.
13 Of course, this does not mean that the traditional type of brain drain is not important. The new type of brain drain merely 
enhances the effects of the traditional type of brain drain.
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To summarise the results, it is not possible to determine the effect of migration 
possibilities on the home country’s average human capital in general. However, if 
the home country’s supply of education is small, then higher migration possibilities 
decrease the average human capital after some of the workers in the home country 
have migrated to the foreign country. This conversely suggests that labour-receiving 
developed countries’ restrictive attitudes towards migrants will generate positive effects 
on labour-sending developing countries through brain gain.
V. Concluding Remarks
Recent studies on migration have indicated the possibility that emigration may have 
positive impacts on labour-sending countries. In particular, migration prospects may 
encourage workers in labour-sending countries to build larger human capital. As a 
result, workers in these countries may experience brain gain as well as brain drain.
Most of these studies implicitly assumed that workers can obtain as much education 
as they want and that they do not have to pay any pecuniary costs. However, these 
assumptions are unrealistic. Education cannot be supplied elastically and freely. Many 
developing countries cannot provide adequate education even in developed countries 
people pay part or all of the pecuniary costs of tertiary education. Moreover, there is a 
growing trend of increasing competitiveness in education markets. Given these facts, 
the paper assumed that the supply of education is not necessarily large, workers pay the 
pecuniary cost for education and its price is determined competitively in the education 
market. Most importantly, I assumed that they have to satisfy the budget constraint to 
demand education.
The paper found that migration possibilities increase the number of workers who 
demand education, but they reduce such workers’ individual demand for education. 
Based on this, I found that the home country’s average human capital decreases with 
migration possibilities if that country cannot sufficiently supply privately-financed 
education. Therefore, I infer that restrictive migration policies adopted by labour-
receiving countries increase the post-migration average human capital of labour-sending 
countries in which the supply of education is insufficient.
We expect that restrictive migration policies of labour-receiving countries will 
reduce the number of emigrants from labour-sending countries, and this in turn 
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alleviates the outflow of human capital. However, in my analyses, positive effects of 
such policies also come from increases in human capital formation due to the higher 
return on education. This is in marked contrast with results of previous analyses, 
according to which lower migration possibilities discourage workers from accumulating 
human capital. These differences are associated with the existence or non-existence of 
the education market and the effects of the education price on its demand.
Today, labour-receiving developed countries are becoming restrictive and selective 
in accepting migrants, and this situation is expected to continue. In addition, labour-
sending developing countries will be unable to overcome the insufficient provision 
of education easily. I attempted to clarify how these trends affect labour-sending 
developing countries. Contrary to our intuition, the results derived in this paper suggest 
that these circumstances are not completely harmful to these countries.
Competitiveness of the education market, the private financing of education and a 
lack of an intergenerational relationship were assumed for the purpose of simplicity. My 
analysis can be extended by relaxing these assumptions.
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